Minsk uncontested and unrealizable

Минск безальтернативный и нереализуемый

© RIA Novosti, Egor Eremov Never hid the fact that I do not consider a possible implementation of the Minsk agreements, but always claimed that they had no alternative. Some see this as a contradiction. Moreover, in social networks for many years is a tough debate between the “bezalternativno” and “derealization”.From my point of view, both statements are quite compatible, and their arguments complement each other. Think ahead of the summit in the Channel format (which in Ukraine still has a chance to hit, but which most likely will be) it would be nice to clarify the duality of the Minsk agreements and to revisit their purpose and meaning.

It is to the purpose, because, like any good strategic decisions in Minsk the goal of not one, but several. At the same time, regardless of which of them will be achieved, Russia wins. And I don’t think it was an accident, because this kind of “accident” accompany Putin all the time of his reign.

In military academies the future generals are taught that when planning an attack is necessary to have two, three, four (the more the better) probable targets. Then the enemy will not know which specific item it needs to protect. If you can still change the chosen direction of the offensive (to make the maneuver on the battlefield), finding that the enemy guessed the direction of your main attack, then a battle you will win in any case. In politics, those laws also apply. Just as in the fields of political battles bullets and not shells exploding, but only a squeak feathers diplomats, Yes, applied information shocks, the beauty of prepared political operations (in addition, in contrast to the transient military, often spread over years and even decades) not so visible, but their meaning usually escapes from the observer, fixing the static state of the conflict at a particular point, instead of to consider it in dynamics.

The implementation of the Minsk agreements with the Russian side and therefore engaged in several different departments headed by experienced and talented politicians, whose efforts koordiniruyutsya personally by the President, that at any moment it was possible to instantly change the direction of the main attack. Just enough today to give priority to one Department, and another tomorrow and all the political and diplomatic Russian army will be deployed on the March in the right direction. By the way, this works well-the tops of the state apparatus — one of the main (if not the biggest) of the achievements of Putin, which allowed him twenty years to withdraw Russia from dangerous traps, and ultimately to withdraw to the position of leading world power. Maneuvers performed by elite of the Russian bureaucracy in accordance with the signals received from the President, the beauty and coherence of performance comparable to transposition on the battlefield, the flute and the drum the grenadiers of Frederick the Great, and the power of the final shot reminiscent of the famous “oblique attack”, 30 years sweeping away from the battlefields any European army (except, of course, Russian).But back to the Minsk agreements. First, the masterpiece is already the fact of their detention (twice in a row in September 2014 and February 2015). Both times, peace at any price was that it is Russia. The Ukrainian army was defeated and fled, the Kiev government was on the verge of collapse, and the alternatives she had (not counting such hypothetical return of Yanukovych). If the agreement was not concluded, Russia would have to take responsibility for Ukraine to the delight of the Americans. Sanctions would be imposed even more broadly, vast resources would have been literally buried in the swamp of Ukrainian anarchy and corruption (to find the other managers, but local would be nowhere, but what a local can bring decent people, shows “ukraineat” in the US — it has just begun, and already broken dozens of careers), there would be neither the strength nor the means nor Syria, nor an active policy in the far East, nor, especially, the Arctic, Africa, and Latin America, financial and economic situation in Russia would be much worse than the present, and political stability would be undermined. Most likely would not be even the “Nord stream — 2”. And certainly would not be “Turkish stream.” And for all this, Russia does not even have had to send the army to Ukraine. With the fall of the Kiev regime (albeit in the civil war) in any case would have to take the territory and population under control, with all the ensuing consequences.

Thus, Mir Moscow needed at least no less than Kiev and much more than Berlin and Paris. While Putin managed to force their negotiating partners to beg Russia about the world and actually dictated to them the conditions of peace.

Secondly, in Kiev almost immediately realized that he had signed and so scared of the possible consequences of the implementation of Minsk, which has openly declared its unwillingness to implement the agreement’s measures and it was from then Ukrainian propaganda has become more insistent to convince the population that the DNR/LNR it is better to refuse in General (not to interfere “to build a European Ukraine). Moreover, Ukrainian politicians speaking of the refusal of the breakaway regions has not used the term “Separate regions of Donetsk and Lugansk regions,” and certainly not the DNR/LNR. They talked about the Donbass, and this allows us to assume that in Kiev do not exclude and do not exclude the possibility of complete failure of the Donbass (in the borders of the two regions). And would have refused, but the Kiev authorities are not willing to take on this responsibility, and Russia did not “occupy” an area.

In this case, if Minsk was made by Kiev that Ukraine would be transformed into flimsy Confederation, in which informal (legalized as the “people’s militia”), the army of the Donbass would be most efficient and organized structure that would change the balance of power in the country and would lead to the displacement of the Galician Pro-Western politicians in the marginal range, and even in emigration, as well as to further Confederation of Ukraine, the actual collapse it to the regions under the formal leadership of Kiev, but in fact oriented toward the nearby capital city. Why Kiev is in opposition to the Minsk process, no matter who led the Ukraine.

Third, the projected failure of Ukraine to fulfill the Minsk agreements allowed Russia sooner or later to enter into direct cooperation with France and Germany, who also could not indefinitely “playing fool” is useless in support of the Kiev regime and against their own interests. Ukraine forced out from active international policy (which currently happens), remaining problem for the EU and Russia (which would help the Russian-Franco-German rapprochement). Hardly anyone then suggested that Ukraine will become a problem for US, but today it is so and neither the Republicans nor the Democrats (whoever wins in the traditional political opposition) will not treat her still).

Fourth, the uncontested leading to the collapse of Ukraine has become a zone of joint responsibility of Russia and the EU. However, Russia, unlike Europe able to establish military-political control over most of Ukraine, and do it mostly by hands trained in recent years, alternative elite DNI/LC. But financial participation in the renovation of Ukraine would have to accept EU, and its share was clearly better than the Russian. Roughly speaking, Russia will restore the Ukraine not so much for its own account, as for the EU money. And yet the fact that it will have to pay some Ukrainian territories (though dropped back in 2015, Putin’s phrase about “Polish Lviv” shows that there may be options).Thus, in any turn of events, the Minsk agreement allowed Russia, keeping a free hand and not spending extra resources to oust the West from Ukraine. So they are uncontested. Another equally good document to sign is difficult, almost impossible. Except that Zelensky in Paris (where is he going to disavow the Minsk agreements) will sign something even more stunning. But to implement them was impossible, as neither Kiev nor the DNR/LNR did not want to end up living in the same state (even formally). However, their fundamental impossibility of realization was provided. The signing of the Minsk agreements, Russia received his in any case (regardless of whether they would or not performed). It was a matter of time, not of principle. And even a convenient time for Moscow, in most cases, could choose for herself.

And the Paris summit here will change nothing. Partners have long understood that Russia outplayed them diplomatically, it is even in Kiev realized even under Poroshenko. They just have to accept.Rostislav Ishchenko

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